ANALYSIS - East Mediterranean Geopolitics - Prospects of a Settlement of the Cyprus issue

(hellenicantidote) - I was reading this long piece by Panayiotis  Ifestos on recent developments in the geopolitics of the Eastern  Mediterranean, in which the professor of international relations  makes a plea for Greece to pull its finger out, reverse  Constantinos Karamanlis’ ‘Cyprus is too far away’ doctrine and  more actively engage in the region, not only for Cyprus’ sake  but for Greece’s too – the security of the two Greek states are,  of course, interdependent.

I was also reading a report from the American Enterprise  Institute – the prominent US conservative think tank, whose  associates and reflections strongly influence the Republican  Party’s foreign policy. Will the Eastern Mediterranean become  the next Persian Gulf? argues that Turkey – mainly because of  its increasing hostility to Israel – is becoming an unreliable  partner to American interests in the region, and suggests that  Cyprus and Greece could form part of a US-led ‘Eastern  Mediterranean Defense Partnership’.

The report states:

    ‘The US Department of State and Pentagon might also  negotiate a naval security site in Limassol, Cyprus. The British  maintain a Permanent Joint Headquarter in 98-square-mile  Sovereign Base Areas in Akrotiri – close to Limassol – and in  Dhekelia, which they use for electronic intelligence gathering  and communications.
    ‘Greece and Britain could join a US-led “Eastern  Mediterranean Defense Partnership” designed to ensure Israel’s  and Cyprus’ exploration rights and seaborne defense against  threats from nearby littoral states and terrorism from the Middle  East. It is essential that the US government convince Greece  and Cyprus that the United States, United Kingdom, and Israel  can guarantee their diplomatic and economic interests more  than Russia and the Arab Middle East.’

I make no assessment on whether it’s in Greece and Cyprus’  interests to become so entwined with the US, UK and Israel, just  note that incorporating Cyprus and Greece into right-wing US  strategic thinking is quite a change.

A couple more points on Ifestos’ piece:

He expresses concern that the economic crisis affecting Cyprus  will so weaken it that a new Annan plan will be imposed. This is  an exaggeration. It should be remembered that the 2004 Annan  plan only emerged because Greece and, following Athens’  recommendation, Cyprus accepted a particular procedure  involving binding UN arbitration, expecting the UN to put  forward an even-handed settlement rather than the disgraceful  concoction it came up with.

The Annan plan expressed an ethos and contained provisions  that no Cypriot government would have freely negotiated, in  which case unless Cyprus accepts a similar arbitration process  – and, given the experience of 2004, this is extremely unlikely –  then a settlement like the Annan plan cannot be imposed on  Greek Cypriots.

Similarly, the particular strategic alignment in 2004, in which the  USA, UK and Israel were content to dismantle the Republic of  Cyprus and allow Turkey to exert itself in the Eastern  Mediterranean, no longer applies, with skepticism over Turkey’s  long-term ambitions in the region prevailing.

More generally, I remain doubtful that the new round of Cyprus  talks scheduled for October will produce a settlement.

It seems to me that Turkey believes that because of the  economic crisis in Cyprus and because President Anastasiades  campaigned in favour of the Annan plan in 2004, then there  exists another opportunity to arrive at a deal, like the Annan  plan, in which all of Turkey’s strategic objectives on Cyprus are  fulfilled. However, Turkey exaggerates Cyprus’ weakness and  puts too much store in Anastasiades’ support for the Annan  plan.

Anastasiades favoured the plan not because he regarded it as  fair and just, but because he (mistakenly, as it transpired)  believed that the consequences of the Greek side rejecting it  would be international recognition of the ‘TRNC’ and the  formalisation of partition. Indeed, there currently exists no  pressing need for the Greek side to accept a settlement on  Turkey’s terms. In fact, it could be argued that Cyprus should  resist any deal for the time being, since there are signs, as  indicated by the AEI report mentioned above, that Turkey’s  strategic hand is weakening and Greece and Cyprus’ improving.

In this scenario, with its value as an energy hub and reliable ally  to US and Israeli interests upgraded, Cyprus will be in a much  better position regarding the terms of a Cyprus settlement it is  able to insist on than it is now and has been for a while.

It’s also worth reminding ourselves, as mentioned in Ifestos’  piece, of how Turkey views Cyprus.

In his tome outlining the principles of neo-Ottomanism,  Strategic Depth: the international position of Turkey, that  country’s foreign minister Ahmet Davoutoglu makes clear  neo-Ottomanism’s belief that Cyprus has to exist within Turkey’s  orbit.

    "Even if there was not one single Muslim Turk there [Cyprus],  Turkey would have to maintain a Cyprus question. No country  could be indifferent to an island like this, positioned at the heart  of its Lebensraum [living space]. The same applies to the  Dodecanese islands, where there no longer exists a significant  Turkish population, but which continue to retain their importance  for Turkey. As the USA has no population projection regarding  Cuba or the other islands in Caribbean and yet retains an  interest in the region, so Turkey is obliged from a strategic point  of view to take an interest in Cyprus, regardless of any human  factor."

Given Turkey’s unrelenting view that Cyprus belongs in its  sphere of influence, then it is hard to imagine Turkey, in the  near future, making the kind of concessions that would make a  settlement acceptable to the Greek side.