We here at HellasFrappe believe this article should be read by our political leaders, our international lenders. think-tanks, and our global friends and foes. Who knows... it might just set them on the right path... after all, the Ancient Greeks paved the way, all we have to do is encourage all the above groups to follow suit.
The theory behind international relations, or the behavior in which states interact, is intriguing. What are international relations? Where did they come from? What do they entail? How has did the term evolve? And what is realism (ahh yes, another favorite theory...)? Well... The study of international relations is best defined as the analysis of the concerns and dealings between and among the world’s governments with the considerations of additional non-state actors, social relationships, and historical and geographical perspectives. However, this vague definition has changed and has molded to the various historical contexts of humanity’s past. It has grown to adapt to situations ranging from the microcosmic and internal struggle among the Peloponnesian forces of the ancient world to the bipolar struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union in the mid-twentieth century. Furthermore, international affairs, as it exists currently, is an even more globalized and multi-faceted arena than ever before. It is through the assessment and clarification of this evolution, that one can best analyze and study such a discipline.
There have been many historical landmarks and significant stages in the progression of international relations, and while it has adapted accordingly, there are still distinct similarities. The application and consequences may change, but ultimately these theories remain somewhat constant. Essentially these theories transcend the historical context by identifying the common threads within policy throughout the years. There are two documents that help identify and solidify this argument. The Melian Dialogue, written by Thucydides during the Athenian invasion of Melos in the 400s BC, and the Sources of Soviet Conduct, written by George Kennan in the late 1940s, both have common themes regardless of thousands of years historical separation and drastically different circumstances. Evident in both documents are dealings of power politics, international prestige, the interests of states, bipolarity, and essentially, the overriding theory of political realism.
Thucydides’ Melian Dialogue, adapted by Suresht Bald, addresses issues between Athens and Melos during the sixteenth year of the Peloponnesian War. Even after the two regional superpowers, Athens and Sparta, signed a peace treaty, each pole still tried to assert their influence over smaller actors on the peninsula. The Melian Dialogue occurred between Athens and Melos, a much smaller Greek city-state. Melos preferred to remain neutral in the conflict, but Athens insisted that the Melians submit to Athenian rule. On the record, the Athenians were troubled by Melos’ previous friendly relations with Sparta. However, Suresht suggests that the Athenians had other reasons. “To allow the weaker Melians to remain free, according to the Athenians, world reflect negatively on Athenian power” (Bald). Essentially the Athenians wanted to improve their power position. Any showing of weakness, Athens felt, would be an indirect concession of power to Sparta.
Athens had no intention on allowing Melos to remain neutral. The dialogue illustrates how the subjugation of the Melians was a key interest for Athens. These talks were somewhat of a formality, allowing Melos to willingly submit rather than suffering a violent overtaking. In the end, Melos still refused to submit, hoping that the gods would spare them and that Sparta would come to their aid. Clearly, neither manifested. The Athenians killed and enslaved the entire population of Melos and sent their own settlers to colonize the city-state.
There are two key components to International Relations that are undeniably evident within this ancient account. The first is the level of analysis. Essentially, this dialogue exists between two states, even though both are a part of Greece. Ancient Greece consisted of city-states, autonomous entities loosely connected through geographic characteristics and some cultural norms. At the time, the Peloponnesus was the world, and therefore the Melian Dialogue is a systemic approach. “This [approach] pays attention to states’ relative power positions in the international system and the interactions among them” (Goldstein). The Athenians were clearly exerting their power over a weaker entity in order to improve their power position. Additionally, since the dialogue completely disregards the internal makeup of both Melos and Athens as well as overlooks the specifics concerning state leadership, there is effective evidence that Thucydides’ account is entirely systemic.
The second component is a political theory that deals primarily with the relationships between and among states. Realism is the school of thought that defines international relations through how states exercise their power. While Melos blindly clung to idealism, in that they appealed to the protection of international law and intended to remain neutral, the dominating force was Athens, who clearly practiced realism’s power politics. Realism argues that power is the key signpost when determining a state’s interests abroad. This is clearly evident in Athenian-Melian affairs. Athens, unknowingly in lieu with the thoughts of modern political realists, conquered Melos claiming that “…by a necessary law of their nature [men] rule wherever they can…all we do is make use of [this law], knowing that you and everyone else having the same power…would do the same…” (Thucydides). Athens was the stronger city-state so it was only natural that they exercised their power over Melos in such a hard-line and amoral fashion. It is also evident that Athens has intentions to improve their power position. “By subjugating the Melians the Athenians hoped not only to extend their empire, but also to improve their image and thus their security” (Bald). States have three primary reasons for using this power: to extend their influence through imperialism; to maintain their power position by ensuring the status quo; or to demonstrate their power in the form of global prestige. States are inclined to use such initiatives to improve their power position.
So what policy prescriptions stem from the Athenian-Melian example? First off, the Athenians illustrate the benefit of maintaining an amoral, realist approach to foreign policy. They had the power to do so and it was in their best interest to consume the weaker power. As a result they were able to expand their imperial holdings as well as increase their international prestige in the face of their primary rival, Sparta. On the other hand, the Melian response illustrates the importance of alliances and international confidence. In the face on certain political takeover, the Melians looked to a rarely acknowledged international system on international laws as well as a loose friendship with the Spartans. As a result they preferred to remain neutral. This example highlights the importance of identifying one’s power position. They were clearly weaker and they knew that they were a target of Athens. However, the Melians decided to remain neutral, lacked the appropriate confidence, and failed to acknowledge their weaker power position. As a result they were overtaken by force. Therefore, it is important to create strong alliances, especially when dealing with a severely stronger power with realist and expansionary intentions.
Thousands of years later, realism is still a dominant force in international relations. George Kennan, a political scientist and American diplomat during the Cold War, published The Sources of Soviet Conduct in the 1947 issue of Foreign Affairs. This article deals primarily with the motives behind the Soviet Union’s foreign policy as well as with the appropriate United States response. Kennan segments his work into four parts. The first two sections identify the historical and ideological development of the USSR and how this currently affects their political personality. The USSR essentially developed out the decisions and initiatives on the individual level and is ultimately a product of ideology and circumstances: “…ideology inherited by the present Soviet leaders from the movement in which they had their political origin, and circumstances of the power which they now have exercised for nearly three decades in Russia” (Kennan). According to Kennan these individuals fused their proud Russian heritage with Marxist ideology and as a result believed that they new what was best for the people and used internal political, coercion, and domestic violence to subjugate a population. These were means to the ends for the Russian bureaucrats and Soviet politicians. If your vision is ideal and ultimately the best for humanity, why not use any means necessary to attain this goal? As a result, the Soviets political personality, and ultimately their foreign policy, at the then current time in the 1950s, reflected the same mentality. There will always be an ingrown incompatibility between capitalism and communism, and the Kremlin will continue to view themselves as being infallible. As a result, Kennan did not foresee the Soviet Union becoming any easier to handle.
In parts three and four, Kennan moves to a more external and international analysis, as opposed to the internally focused first two sections. He proceeds to lay out a containment policy as the primary means of stemming the spread of Soviet influence as well as reiterating that the United States must always remain a rival to the Soviet Union as communism does not allow for a happy coexistence with capitalism. Because of the nature of the Soviet Union’s leaders as well as the fundamental pillars of the communist ideology, the USSR’s foreign policy was one of patience, downplaying international force and violence. However, according to Kennan, it would be dangerous to back the USSR into a corner because, like most world powers, the Soviets would be unlikely back down and sacrifice their international image and prestige. Therefore, Kennan concludes that containment is the best policy. Allow the USSR to exist but prevent it from spreading, and eventually, due to its internal flaws, it will collapse in on itself.
This document differs from Thucydides Melian Dialogue as for what level of analysis is utilized by the author. Thucydides used exclusively a systemic level. Kennan on the other hand uses a different approach for various segments of his work. Kennan did utilize a systemic approach, but also analyzed the Soviet Union on a domestic and even individual level. He discusses the importance of Lenin as well as the psychology of Soviet leaders in line with individualistic analysis. He also addresses the style of government and the harsh effects of the Soviet peoples, which corresponds with a domestic level. And, as is expected from a document rooted in foreign policy, Kennan discusses the US-Soviet relations through a more systemic viewpoint.
But what of political theories? While Kennan’s article does focus on internal affairs as well as domestic issues and historical context, there is still evidence that realism has played a significant role in the Soviet Union’s development as well as in US-Soviet relations. The realism-based “means to an end” mentality exercised domestically in Russia inevitably seeped out into their foreign policy. Clearly, power, in the form of influence, was a key motive in Soviet foreign policy. However, because of the natural patience of Soviet ideology, their international initiative were more in-line with maintaining their power, i.e. ensuring the status quo. There was also a natural sense of prestige in that they were a pole in a bipolar world. “While the Kremlin is basically flexible in its reaction to political realities, it is by no means unamenable to considerations of prestige” (Kennan). These two realist approaches, when coupled together, could provide dangerous for its power-based counterpart, the United States. While realism did dictate that national interest was of a higher priority than individual pride and national ideology, the Soviet Union was flawed in that they held their international prestige in high of a regard, and Kennan warned that the Soviets could be increasingly irrational if another power consistently threatened their prestige.
As a result, Kennan brilliantly illuminates a key policy prescription when dealing with the USSR: that of containment. The Soviet Union was not Nazi Germany, nor was it Napoleon’s France. There was no need to violently react to a dangerous power that was a minimal threat to national security at the time. Rather, prevent then from spreading. Contain their ideology. In this sense, the US could respect the USSR’s prestige as well as their Russian pride, without being overly threatening. If a foreign government, namely the United States, intend to have successful political dealings with the USSR then they should “…remain at all times cool and collected and that its demands on Russian policy should be put forward in such a manner as to leave the way open for a compliance not too detrimental to Russian prestige” (Kennan). When exercising foreign policy, Kennan recommends being mindful of a states internal forces, such as culture and ideology. Additionally, it is just as important to assess a rival on a domestic and individual level as well. Kennan stated explicitly that the USSR would likely collapse in on itself due to the multitude of domestic flaws and the consistent civil unrest. As a result, containment is the ideal policy prescription, according to Kennan, as it respects Soviet prestige, prevents irrational Soviet response, and allows the Soviet Union to simply fall apart as a result of its own internal and historical shortcomings.
All in all, it is evident that international relations have been an important political initiative since the ancient world up to the current date. While, these lessons are captured in various primary texts, it is important to realize that some policies, procedures, and theories are essentially timeless. Realism is one such theory. While not always applicable, it has served to be the primary explanation for Peloponnesian expansion in the ancient world, as well as for the US containment policies and soviet growth in the bipolar world of the mid twentieth century. (kmiande)
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