Declassified Reports Shed Light On Cyprus Issue

Cyprus (credit: e r j k p r u n c z y k)

The declassified reports that follow are only a small sample of a series of similar documents have been released by the CIA on the Cyprus issue.

September 19, 1954

The Soviet government will support Greek claims to Cyprus in any Un discussion
Comment: Soviet support for Greek claims in the UN would be motivated primarily by Moscow’s desire to weaken the West in the Mediterranean by promoting the transfer of the island base from British to Greek control. After the evacuation of Suez by British troops, Cyprus is scheduled to become the headquarters for British ground and air forces in the Middle East. A pro-Greek stand by the USSR would also complement the increasingly effective efforts of Soviet ambassador Sergeyev to improve relations with the Greeks.

June 25, 1955

Cyprus government planning for “full state of emergency” - The Cyprus government believes that order can be restored on the island only by immediate forceful action, according to the American consul in Nicosia. It has therefore recommended to London that a full state of emergency be declared and that terrorism be halted by whatever steps are necessary. The local population is increasingly apprehensive that the violence will spread, and the government believes that firm action would be welcomed by “a large number” of Cypriots. There are also increasing possibilities for serious trouble between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots.
The Cyprus government has indirectly approached Archbishop Makarios, leader of the movement seeking union of Cyprus with Greece, who is reported to have said he would support a liberal constitutional proposal with recognition of the right to eventual self-determination for Cyprus.
Comment: Acceptance by Makarios of such a constitutional proposal might be a step toward settlement of the Cyprus problem. The situation has deteriorated so far, however, that Greek public and official opinion, as well as Greek Cypriot opinion, may tolerate no less than immediate self-determination, which would result in union with Greece.
Continuation of the Cyprus issue at its present peak seriously damages Greek-British relations, creates strong Greek-Turkish antagonism, impairs the effectiveness of the Balkan pact, and is an irritant in Greek-American relations.

May 10, 1956

The new Cypriot crisis - The imminent execution of two Greek Cypriots convicted of terrorist activities against the British will probably result in increased violence on the island and have serious repercussions in mainland Greece. Demonstrations began in Cyprus as soon as Governor General Harding announced that clemency would not be granted. The British have sufficient troops on the island to control a general uprising. The Cypriot nationalist organization EOKA, which is responsible for the violence, will lose some prestige if it fails to prevent the executions.
Possibly even more significant are the reactions in Greece. Widespread demonstrations against the British have already occurred in Athens and Salonika and disorder will probably increase if the executions are carried out. Greek police and army units have been alerted to protect British and American installations and should be capable of handling large-scale disorders. Rioters are likely to attack both US and British installations.
The executions, if they occur, would force the Greek government to take a stronger stand against Britain. Athens has already protested to London and has appealed to the United States, the UN Security Council, and the European Commission on the Rights of Man to prevent the executions. Greece may break off diplomatic relations with Britain. Foreign Minister Theotokis is almost certain to be removed and the Karamanlis government, under strong attack by the opposition, could collapse.

August 23, 1956

The request by EOKA, the Cypriot nationalist organization, on August 16 for a truce with the British apparently surprised both the Greek government and British authorities on Cyprus. EOKA will undoubtedly resume operations if the British do not respond favorably.  EOKA may have asked for a truce because the security forces have been making progress in their antiterrorist campaign and because many Cypriots are beginning to be disillusioned with EOKA’s policy of violence. The organization may also have considered that the influence of the nationalist spokesman, Archbishop Makarios, who has been in exile for six months, was diminishing and a truce would give an excuse for bringing him back into the picture.
Greek prime minister Karamanlis, although pleased at the improved prospects for settling the dispute, has complained that his government should have been consulted so it could have laid the diplomatic groundwork for American support of compromise attempts. Greek officials reportedly feel that only Makarios has sufficient prestige to negotiate a compromise with the British that would be acceptable both to Cypriot nationalists and the Greek government.
Greek foreign minister Averoff has expressed the intention of resuming talks with the British and of sending the Greek ambassador back to London. He hopes thus to clear the way for the return of Makarios from Seychelles to London and the opening of substantive talks. Averoff plans to offer a simple agreement reaffirming the principle of self-determination, with the application to be worked out over an indefinite period between the Cypriots and the British government. He also envisages that police powers on the island would be retained by London for two years, after which consideration could be given to turning these powers over to the local government. Britain would retain responsibility for defense and foreign affairs indefinitely. Averoff also would suggest a lower house of parliament with proportional Greek and Turkish representation and an upper house with equal representation. Greek and Cypriot nationalist reaction to Harding’s offer has been unfavorable. The mayor of Nicosia declared that EOKA had not been defeated and therefore probably would not surrender. Both EOKA and Athens consider Makarios the key to further negotiations with Britain and will probably consider that only the archbishop’s return from exile will prove British good faith.

March 3, 1958

Greek Cabinet Resigns - The resignation of Greek Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis and his cabinet on 2 March, following loss of a parliamentary majority when 15 deputies withdrew their support, has placed the initiative for future political action in the hands of King Paul. The 15 deputies have formed a new political party under Panagiotis Papaligouras, one of two cabinet ministers who resigned on 27 February after a dispute with the prime minister regarding a new electoral law.
When submitting his resignation, Karamanlis suggested that the King dissolve parliament and call for new national elections. His actions in promoting a split within his cabinet and then resigning may have been undertaken in the hope that new elections would strengthen his position. However, many Greek politicians including the leaders of the Liberals, second largest party in Greece, are firmly opposed to elections at this time and are pressing the King to appoint another conservative prime minister to head an interim government. If elections are called immediately, they will be held under the present electoral law which favors Karamanlis’ National Radical Union but also makes probable an electoral coalition of center and leftist parties, as happened in 1956.
Elections at this time would give Communist sympathizers and others an opportunity to exploit popular feeling connected with the Cyprus issue and the possible location of American missile bases in Greece. Failure to hold immediate elections, however, would probably lead to a long period of political instability in Greece, with the result that government initiative in the fields of domestic and foreign policy would be seriously inhibited.

May 13, 1958

Greek Elections - The unexpectedly heavy vote received by the Communist front United Democratic Left (EDA) in the Greek national elections on 11 May has overshadowed the absolute victory of the conservative, pro-Western National Radical Union (ERE) of Constantine Karamanlis. While ERE dropped to 42 percent of the popular vote compared to 47 percent in the 1956 elections, it will increase its representation in the new Chamber of Deputies from 164 seats to approximately 175. This will give Karamanlis a substantial working majority in the 300-member parliament as long as he is able to control the many diverse factions within his party.
The complex electoral law, which permitted the ERE to take a sizable majority of the parliamentary seats despite receiving a minority of the popular vote, also works to the advantage of EDA, which gained a larga number of “bonus” seats for running second. EDA nosed out the Liberal party, a traditional center party and previously the second largest party in the chamber, and will increase its representation from 17 seats in the old parliament to approximately 75 in the new. The Liberals will decline from 67 seats to about 36, while two minor parties will account for less than 20 in the new parliament.
EDA won about 24 percent of the total vote, apparently picking up a large “protest” vote in addition to the votes of the far left party. Discontent among wage earners, who object to the government’s wage-freeze policy, and among nationalists, who disagree with Greece’s “inferior” role in NATO and the apparent lack of progress toward a “desirable” solution of the Cyprus problem, probably accounted for a significant proportion of EDA’s voting strength. The vote probably does not indicate any substantial increase in the number of hard-core Communist adherents in Greece.
The position of EDA as leader of the opposition will tend to polarize Greek politics and may lead to defections from the Liberals and the smaller parties to the two major parties. While EDA will not be able to challenge the final passage of ERE-sponsored legislation in the new parliament, it can be expected to use every means to harass and delay the pro-Western policies of Karamanlis.

June 26, 1958

Cyprus: Archbishop Makarios apparently favors maintaining the status quo on Cyprus, fearing the British and Turks would “gang up” against the Greeks if violence were resumed. There is as yet no Turkish reaction to the Greek decision not to cooperate with Turkey within NATO. Some Greek civilian NATO employees have returned to Izmir, where special security measures are being relaxed.
Cyprus: It appears likely, however, that the Greek Cypriots will continue their partial boycott of British goods until Makarios is allowed to return to Cyprus.
Meanwhile, the British have officially denied press reports that EOKA leader Grivas was killed on 23 June. The report of his death, however, may cause Grivas to take some action -a signed memorandum to the Cypriots, at least- to reassure the population that he is still alive.
Information from Turkey tends to confirm previous reports that the extraordinary security measures taken near Greek, British, US and NATO installations in Izmir on 23 June were prompted by threatening remarks overheard and reported to the governor of Izmir. Ten alleged Communists have been arrested for planning to attack the British and Greek consulates in Izmir. A reduction in the number of security troops was noted on 24 June, suggesting that any immediate danger was considered over. The Turkish press continues to be inflammatory, and speakers at recent mass meetings have been violently anti-Greek. The announcement on 24 June by Greek Foreign Minister Averoff that cooperation with Turkey in NATO was no longer possible was probably based on a desire to placate anti-Turkish feeling in Greece but may draw a sharp reaction from Ankara, which usually disparages Greece’s contributions to NATO.
Governor Foot’s sudden trip to London on 24 June was due to fear that anticipated Labor party criticism of the government’s new Cyprus proposals in the 26 June debate in Commons would lead to violence on Cyprus. Labor party leaders, however, had previously decided not to oppose the proposals nor to force a vote on the issue.

July 8, 1958

Cyprus: An island-wide general strike has been launched to protest the death of two Greek Cypriots in an open clash with British security forces.
Cyprus: Cyprus is again the scene of murders, arson, intimidation and intercommunal strife as each faction tries to outdo the other in exerting pressure on the British. Greek Cypriots on 7 July staged a general strike to protest the death of two demonstrators killed by British security forces during a brief clash with several hundred Greek Cypriots. Turkish Cypriots continue, by threats, fire, and armed attack, to force Greeks to leave Turkish sectors of Cypriot cities. They have also issued an ultimatum to Governor Foot threatening violence, presumably against the British, if the government does not approve separate municipal councils by 15 July.
In the diplomatic phase of the dispute, all interested parties are showing more flexibility regarding the British proposals. Athens has indicated a willingness to accept the plan if both union with Greece and partition are ruled out and if the Governor’s advisers are chose by the Cypriots instead of by Greece and Turkey. The Turks continue to be adamant concerning eventual partition of Cyprus but have again called for tripartite discussions on the problem.
The best prospect for diplomatic progress appears to be in discussions among the permanent North Atlantic Council representatives of Britain, Greece, and Turkey. Permanent representatives of Greece and Turkey have been recalled to Athens and Ankara for top-level discussions.
In contrast to the expressed optimism of Prime Minister Macmillan regarding the diplomatic prospects, Governor Foot is discouraged by continued Greek violence, which prevents the return of Archbishop Makarios, regarded by him as essential for any real progress toward settlement of the problem. He has contacted Makarios requesting a period free of violence for apparently two months.

August 16, 1958

Cyprus: Britain’s announcement on 15 August that it intends to begin carrying out a modified version of its Cyprus plan indicates London intends to go ahead in the face of warning about adverse effects among the Greek-Cypriots and on the Greek government.
Britain Announces Modifications of Cyprus Plan
Britain acted swiftly to announce implementation of its seven-year plan for Cyprus following the return of Prime Minister Macmillan from his visit to Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia. The plan, as announced in London on 15 August, contains several modifications of the original plan made public on 19 June. These changes appear designed to overcome Greek objections to the proposals while retaining the general features of the plan which Turkey previously accepted.
Modifications designed to appeal to Athens include: elimination of official representatives of Greece and Turkey on the Governor’s Council –though official representatives to the governor’s office still be appointed; indefinite postponement of the provisions calling for Cypriots to have dual nationality; and a vague reference to the possibility of a single island-wide legislature at some future date. In addition, the British again have announced that, following a period of peace on the island, Archbishop Makarios will be allowed to return to participate in electoral preparations.
While the British announcement goes far to ease Greek fears that partition is being facilitated by the new plan, it does not preclude the possibility of eventual partition. In addition, the new announcement calls upon the governor to authorize, where feasible, the establishment of separate Greek and Turkish Cypriot municipal councils.
Immediate Greek reaction is unfavorable, with both Foreign Minister Averoff and a representative of Makarios terming the new plan “unacceptable”. Averoff’s principal objections are centered on the retention of official representatives of Greece and Turkey and the proposed separate municipal councils.
Ankara’s reaction to the British modifications is unknown. Turkish leaders informed Macmillan during his recent trip to Ankara, however, that they would support the original plan but would demand a tripartite meeting of Britain, Greece, and Turkey if modifications were introduced.
Britain’s first step in implementing the new plan will be the preparation of electoral rolls for the island, which may take two or three months. Meanwhile, London has called on Athens and Ankara to appoint their representatives by 1 October to confer with Cyprus Governor Foot.

August 30, 1958

Cyprus: The relations of EOKA leader Grivas with Athens and Archbishop Makarios are deteriorating. This lessens the ability of the Greek government and the Archbishop to restrain future EOKA activities.
Cyprus: The voluntary cease-fire maintained by the Greek-Cypriot underground organization EOKA since 4 August may be broken in the near future and new attacks launched against the British. EOKA has been hurt by recent British security drives on Cyprus, and EOKA leader Grivas may be tempted to renew violence before his forces are further reduced by capture or declining morale. He has indicated his dissatisfaction at the “indecisiveness” of the Greek Government and its failure to threaten withdrawal from the Western alliance system unless its allies show greater sympathy on the Cyprus problem. Relations between Grivas and Archbishop Makarios have also deteriorated. A complete rupture in their relations, while improbable at this time, would eliminate one of the few potential restraints on the EOKA leader.
Both Makarios and Greek Foreign Minister Averoff appear to favor continued peace on the island while they seek a favorable resolution regarding Cyprus at the next regular session of the UNGA. The British have repeatedly indicated that following a limited period of peace on Cyprus they would permit the return of Makarios from exile –a move much desired by most Greek Cypriots.
Meanwhile, the government of Greece continues its refusal to cooperate in implementing London’s new plan for Cyprus. The Greek Cypriots, who constitute 80 percent of the population of the island, are also united in opposing the plan. Greek Foreign Minister Averoff hopes this noncooperation will force London to make further concessions to the Greek position. The British, however, realize that further concessions to Athens might cause the Turks to reconsider their decision to cooperate.
Cooperation between Greece and the US continues to be affected by Greek belief that Washington is supporting the Anglo-Turkish “side” in the Cyprus dispute.

February 18, 1959

Cyprus: Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis fears that Archbishop Makarios may “torpedo” the London conference on Cyprus. The British also express concern. Makarios reportedly has already balked over Britain’s request for guarantees of base rights and would certainly oppose a transition period of about a year as envisaged by London. Makarios has the support of the Greek Cypriots and his opposition to the plan would make its implementation difficult.

March 31, 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: The Cyprus Problem
The long-standing dispute over the future status of the British crown colony of Cyprus was regarded by most observers as resolved by a series of international agreements signed in London in February 1959 which provided for complete independence. The signatories represented Britain, Greece, Turkey and the two major communities on Cyprus –the 450.000 Greek Cypriots and the 100.000 Turkish Cypriots. Good progress in implementing the agreement was made during the ensuing months but in late 1959 a serious controversy developed over the size of the two bases Britain is to retain. As a result, independence for Cyprus, which was to have been proclaimed by 19 February 1960, has been postponed. Relations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, which had improved dramatically following conclusions of the Cyprus agreements in 1959, have begun to show new strains as a result of the present impasse.
The Cyprus agreements provided that Britain would transfer sovereignty over the island to the new Republic of Cyprus except for two areas – neither specifically demarcated. The agreements also specified that the new republic would assure Britain “the rights and facilities necessary to enable the two areas to be used effectively as military bases”. At Akrotiri, on the southernmost tip of Cyprus, the British maintain on of the largest air bases in the Middle East and are in the process of establishing there the headquarters of their unified Middle East Command.
In discussing the base problems, the Greek Cypriots, led by Archbishop Makarios, president elect of the future Cypriot Republic, attempted from the beginning to limit the base areas to a maximum of 36 square miles. The Turkish Cypriots, under Fazil Kuchuk, the future vice president, favored limiting the British to the smallest possible areas, although they have been less rigid in their position than the Greek Cypriots.
The British originally requested about 150 square miles but later reduced this to 120 square miles.
The Turkish Cypriots have sought to mediate with a proposal of 80 square miles. This is acceptable to Makarios, but it has been rejected by the British. London has also rejected other proposed compromises, such as putting part of the proposed base areas under long-term lease to the British.
Currently there is considerable speculation in Nicosia about a compromise at approximately 100 square miles. While Greek Cypriot spokesman have indicated that any figure under 100 probably would be acceptable, the British have insisted they cannot reduce their demand for 120 square miles by more than a token amount.
The British proposals have been publicly rejected by Makarios largely on economic grounds –complaining that the base areas contain some of the best arable land on the island and a disproportional amount of vital water resources. His real reasons, however, appear to be an exaggerated fear that he would lose political support on Cyprus by capitulating to the British and his “intuition” that London will eventually make further concessions. A major concession by Makarios to the British on the base issue would reduce his popular prestige. With no other nationalist leader of stature among the Greek Cypriots, a real decline in his popularity would probably redound to the advantage of the Communist-led political party on the island, which is presently believed capable of securing the support of 35 percent of the Greek voters.
Recent warnings that the present negotiations could break down and imperil the original settlement have caused uneasiness, particularly among the Turkish Cypriots. Miscalculation on the part of the present negotiators could of course, lead to a breakdown, with its attendant threat to security. It appears unlikely to us, however, that any party to the original Cyprus agreements would permit a real breakdown and possible repudiation of that settlement.

October 17, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRATARY OF STATE
SUBJECT: New Action Program for Cyprus
The President is concerned over reports that we may be headed for trouble in Cyprus. He feels we should do all we can in cooperation with the Guarantor Powers to prevent a showdown between the Greek and Turkish communities.
He would like the Department of State to provide him by 28 October with its recommendations on what measures might be taken to this end.

June 19, 1964

SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
THE CYPRUS DISPUTE
THE PROBLEM
To examine possible lines of settlement of the Cyprus dispute and their implications for the parties involved.

CONCLUSIONS

• A. The present drift toward a de facto Greek Cypriot state cannot go much further without provoking a more serious military confrontation with the Turkish Cypriots. An independent Cyprus has come to pose the dangers of provoking an invasion by Turkey to prevent the island from falling wholly under Greek Cypriot sway or of becoming heavily Communist-influenced, and these considerations are becoming of increasing concern to the Western countries most intimately involved.
• B. An early settlement based on the hope of cooperation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots is virtually precluded by their mutual hostility. Two remaining possibilities are enosis (union with Greece) and double enosis (division of the island between Greece and Turkey). Most Greek Cypriots favor the former, but all would be strongly opposed to the latter. Whatever Makarios’ private view, he would find it difficult openly to oppose enosis. Either enosis or double enosis would make continuance of UK bases and US facilities likely. Both solutions would be opposed by the USSR and the UAR, which dislike the maintenance of Western power positions in the Levant.
• C. To force a settlement and to make it work would require the support of Athens, which strongly favors enosis, and of Ankara, which advocates the double enosis solution. It is possible that both governments could accept a combination of the two approaches: i.e., a Cyprus united to Greece, but containing an area under some sort of Turkish administration. But it would be a tricky business since both governments have limited freedom of maneuver: Ankara because of military and political pressures on Inonu’s minority government, Athens because for domestic political reasons Papandreou is reluctant to exercise leadership.
• D. An agreed settlement is most unlikely without considerable US pressure, which would result at least for a time in damage to US relations with Greece, or Turkey, or both. Failing a settlement, we believe that Turkey would be moved to intervene to protect the Turkish community. In this case, Greece would be prepared to send additional forces to Cyprus. In the tension and confusion, armed clashes would be likely, but both sides would be reluctant to expand hostilities.

DISCUSSION

I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DISPUTE

1. Despite a long history of Greek-Turkish animosity, dating from the Greek struggle for independence from Turkey during the nineteenth century, the Greek and Turkish communities on Cyprus, which came under British control in 1878, lived together for many years without serious strife. Then in the 1950’s, violent agitation by the Greek community for enosis (union with Greece) directly involved Greece and Turkey with their communities on the island. The resulting disorders were finally ended by the London-Zurich Accords, which established an independent Cyprus based on the concept of administrative separation of the two communities without geographic partition. To secure the agreement of all parties it was necessary to include o Treaty of Guarantee which gave Greece, Turkey, and the UK the right to intervene jointly or individually in the internal affairs of the island should this be deemed necessary to uphold the agreements.
2. Lack of mutual confidence prevented the two communities from cooperating in running the government. The Greek majority (80 percent of the population) was determined to get rid of the constitutional provisions which gave the Turkish minority a veto power in matters of foreign affairs, defense and key domestic issues. For their part, the Turks clung rigidly to the constitutional safeguards as their best protection against the Greek majority. In late 1963, President Makarios presented 13 amendments to the constitution which would have created a unitary state under majority rule. Turkey quickly rejected these proposals. In this tense atmosphere, a minor incident sparked violence which rapidly engulfed the island. The more numerous and better organized Greek communal forces quickly seized the initiative and isolated the Turkish community. The British peace-keeping force, which went into operation in January 1964 with the consent of the order Guarantor Powers and both Cypriot communities, incurred the animosity of both communities and was unable to prevent new violence. The activation of a UN peace-keeping force in March 1964 has brought about a gradual reduction in violence, though both sides are dissatisfied with the situation. Moreover, the continued receipt of arms by both communities has turned the island into an armed camp, and hatred and bitterness have reached a high level.

II. THE FORCES AT WORK

The Greek community and Athens

3. Makarios is clearly the paramount figure on the island. He is a shred bargainer and a clever political manipulator. He appears to enjoy his position as head of an independent state. We are not certain of his private view of the enosis issue, though it is a popular cause among the Greek Cypriots and he cannot openly oppose it. Though he generally makes the final decisions in Greek communal affairs, his control is far from complete. There is a group of secondary leaders who have sharp personal differences and sometimes disagree on issues and tactics, and clashes between their followers cannot be ruled out. Next to Makarios in influence is probably General George Grivas, the former leader of EOKA, the militant Greek Cypriot organization that fought for enosis in the 1950’s. Grivas has thus far not challenged Makarios’ political primacy, but he is a fervent anti-Communist and advocate of enosis. The growing sentiment for enosis in Cyprus tends to increase Grivas’ prestige and influence. He has many supporters on the island, including Minister of Interior Georkatzis and the newly appointed commander of the Greek Cypriot National Guard, an organization designed to supersede the various autonomous armed bands.

4. Since the outbreak of violence in December 1963, the already significant influence of Communist-oriented groups in the Greek community has increased. Makarios apparently does not regard the Communist as an immediate threat, and has taken no action against them. The Communist Party (AKEL), which probably influences between one-fourth to one-third of the Greek Cypriots, has strongly supported Makarios. Dr. Vasos Lyssarides, who is Makarios’ personal physician and confidant, has emerged as a leader of a Communist-influenced guerilla band and as an important go-between with the Soviet Ambassador.

5. At the moment, Makarios is something of an embarrassment for Athens. On occasion the Greek Government has even attempted -without conspicuous success- to hold Makarios in check, particularly in discouraging his entanglements with the Bloc. However, public opinion in Greece so strongly supports the aspirations of the Greek community that it has been difficult for any Greek government openly to oppose Makarios. The Greek Government clearly favors union with Cyprus as merely an intermediate stage. However, Athens feels inhibited to some extent in voicing these views by a number of considerations. In fact, the Greek Government has publicly handled the Cyprus problem in relatively low key, though it has at least tacitly condoned clandestine arms shipments and has allowed the Greek military contingent to aid the Greek Cypriots.

The Turkish community and Ankara

6. The Turkish communal leadership is neither strong nor self-sufficient. Its most able member, Raul Denktash, has been prevented by Makarios from returning to the island since January 1964. Both he and Vice President Kuchuk, the community’s nominal leader, have been almost entirely subservient to Ankara. Indeed, the Turkish community has little scope for independent action since its weakness vis-a-vis the Greek Cypriots forces to rely directly to Turkish military and diplomatic support for its very existence. Thus Turkey, not the Turkish community on Cyprus, calls the tune.

7. For some time the Turks have been supplying men and material to the beleaguered community. Some regroupment of the Turkish community has taken place, in part for reasons of security, in part to create a basis for partition or federation. This regroupment, though far from complete, has made it possible for the Turkish Cypriot Resistance Organization and the Turkish army contingent stationed on Cyprus to provide a measure of protection. This protection and the threat of Turkish intervention have kept hope alive among the Turkish Cypriots and stiffened their determination to resist. Nevertheless, the regard their future with apprehension bordering on desperation.
Other Outside Forces

8. Britain’s obligations as a Guarantor Power and its concern for its sovereign base areas on the island have kept the UK closely involved in the dispute. Aw might be expected, this involvement has resulted in changes by each community that the British are unduly favoring the other and has led to increasing opposition by the Greek Cypriots to the British sovereign bases. The British role has also periodically caused disappointment and anger in Athens and Ankara. Despite recent reductions, the UK contingent in still the largest in the peace-keeping force. Moreover, London has just indicated a willingness to make an additional financial contribution to the support of the operation.

9. Both the UN Secretary General and the powers concerned recognize that the peace-keeping force will be needed on Cyprus for more than the three months authorized. The UN force has had difficulty in establishing order, and the present tenuous equilibrium could be upset at any time. UN mediator Tuomioja has been unable to devise any proposals for a realistic settlement. Though he seems personally inclined toward enosis, he apparently feels it inappropriate for him to recommend the dissolution of a UN state. If the recommendations of the UN mediator are not satisfactory to Makarios, the latter may take the Cyprus controversy to the UN General Assembly where he obviously counts on diplomatic support from the Soviet Bloc and the nonaligned nations.

10. The possibility of Greek-Turkish clashes over Cyprus has aroused concern in NATO, but Secretary General Stikker has so far been unable to move the two sides closer together. NATO intercession is not likely to prove effective in promoting a settlement, though the psychological effect of NATO membership probably tends to inhibit an outbreak of Greek-Turkish hostilities or limit any clash that might occur.

11. The Soviets see clear opportunities as well as dangers in the dispute. Its prolongation obviously weakens NATO. Moscow also desires the elimination of British sovereign bases on Cyprus, in order to undermine the ability of the UK to support its interests in the Near and Middle East. Soviet prestige on Cyprus has risen as a result of Moscow’s support of Makarios. The emergence of an independent unitary Greek Cypriot state would increase the prospects for greater Soviet influence on the island. However, the Soviets seem concerned lest their involvement give impetus to demands for enosis, which would lead to restrictions on the Communists and a reduced role for Moscow. They are also worried about intervention by Turkey, which would create a major crisis and jeopardize the continued independence of Cyprus. Hence, though they feel bound to support Makarios as the leader of a “national liberation struggle”, they recognize the disadvantages of any serious involvement. Makarios has sought to obtain stronger Soviet support for the Greek Cypriot cause and has given considerable publicity to his request for heavy arms. It seems likely that the Soviets will attempt to stall of any decision to supply heavy arms, though they may furnish small arms, ammunition, and the like –perhaps through the UAR, from which some arms have already reached Makarios. The USSR has been at some pains to limit the damage to its relations with Turkey.

12. The UAR seeks the elimination of British bases, which it regards as primarily designed to exert military pressure on the Arabs. The UAR also would not like to see the absorption of a formerly nonaligned state into a NATO member state. Thus it supports an independent Cyprus under Makarios. To this end the UAR has given small arms and probably will continue to do so.

III. THE OUTLOOK FOR A SETTLEMENT

13. During the past six months, the situation on Cyprus has moved a considerable distance toward the de facto establishment of a Greek Cypriot state. The Greek Cypriots are in complete control of the government, and seem determined to push ahead and achieve full control of the island. The Turkish Cypriots are constantly threatened with shortages of food, medicine, and water. Nevertheless, the Turkish Cypriots have substantially improved their defensive position by virtue of their regroupment and the arms they have received from Turkey. We believe that Ankara would intervene military in the island rather than see the Turkish Cypriot position eroded away or extinguished.

14. At the same time, both Athens and Ankara are coming to the conclusion that a fully independent Cyprus is not in their interest, or in the interest of the West in general. If Makarios achieved such status, he might move to eliminate the British bases, and he would have no compunctions about accepting Soviet support for the effort. The US special facilities on the island would also be in serious danger. Moreover, Makarios apparently sees little danger in cooperating with the Cypriot Communists, who are strong and well organized. There is a significant chance that an independent Cyprus would gradually fall under increasing Communist influence and perhaps in time under Communist control.

15. Any early settlement based on the hope of future cooperation between the Greek and Turkish communities is virtually precluded by the bitterness and hostility that has grown up between them. This would appear to rule out implementation of the London-Zurich Accords. Nor would the Greek Cypriots accept a “federation” which recognized and protected the rights of the Turkish Cypriots as a community rather than as individual citizens in a Greek Cypriot controlled state. “Partition” -the establishment of two independent states on the island- would be strongly opposed by the Greek community and, even if it could be brought about, would probably involve continuing hostilities between the two entities.

16. Present circumstances have brought two more fundamental approaches under consideration. One is enosis (union with Greece). The other is some formula under which the island would be divided between Greece and Turkey; this has come to be known as double enosis.
Double Enosis

17. Double enosis would be the more acceptable to the Turks. It probably would permit continuance of the British base areas, though perhaps not in their present sovereign status. It would almost certainly permit the US facilities to remain. However, even if agreement were reached on the principle of double enosis, there would be extreme haggling over how the island was to be divided. While extensive population shifts would be necessary, we regard these as less difficult to arrange than to gain Greek Cypriot acceptance of such a division. There would be a serious danger that the Greek Cypriots would launch an all-out attack on the areas held by the Turkish community if they thought it necessary to prevent such a settlement. Further, it is unlikely that any Greek government could accept double enosis and remain in office. There might be considerable opposition in the UN, with the USSR taking a leading part.

18. Support for double enosis by the US would have a severe impact on US-Greek relations. Thus far US relations with Greece have not suffered any extensive damage, as the US has not pressed the Greek Government toward any particular solution. However, the continuing threat of Turkish intervention is eroding the Greeks’ confidence in the US, which they believe has the power to prevent any Turkish move. Moreover, as proposals for solution emerge, the Greeks will be quick to resent and will strongly resist US efforts to encourage concessions.

Enosis

19. The Turks have so far refused to consider enosis as a solution. They would view the possession of Cyprus by Greece as contrary to their own strategic interests, though less threatening than if the island were in the hands of a Communist-influenced Greek Cypriot Government. They are also moved by considerations of prestige and by concern for the welfare of the Turkish community. Those Turkish Cypriots who wished to leave the island would have to be compensated, and such compensation might be more acceptable to Ankara if it came, at least apparently, from the Greeks. Moreover, in view of its distrust of the Greek Cypriot leadership, Ankara would probably insist that Cyprus not retain any significant autonomy, but be run directly from Athens like other Greek provinces. More important, any settlement probably would have to provide some sort of continuing Turkish presence on the island. A settlement including a Turkish base or an enclave under Turkish sovereignty might come to be regarded by Turkey as acceptable, since it could provide some degree of protection for Turkish strategic interests and an element of security -at least psychological- to the Turkish Cypriots. The Turks have thus far shown little interest in territorial concessions in the Greek islands and only slightly more in Thrace. What they want is a presence on Cyprus itself.

20. The Turkish Government has only limited flexibility on the Cyprus issue. Inonu himself is aware of the perils involved, concerned for Turkey’s ties with the West (especially the US), and desirous of attaining a negotiated solution. But feels that the political military supporters on whom his minority government depends, as well as popular opinion, demand the protection of Turkish national prestige and Turkish interests on Cyprus, so that he must threaten unilateral intervention when these are in danger. The repeated postponements of military moves against Cyprus have created an atmosphere of disappointment and frustration which has already threatened to disrupt the delicate equilibrium of the Turkish political scene. Indeed, if another intervention crisis should arise -as is likely unless some tangible progress toward a solution is made in the near future- Inonu might be faced with the choice of acquiescing in a military move or being pushed aside. He would have extreme difficulty in persuading parliament and the military to accept enosis –even coupled with territorial or base concessions.

21. The leverage which the US or other Western powers can exert on Turkey is limited. Turkish threats of unilateral intervention have already produced a series of confrontations with the US, each growing in intensity and each progressively embittering relations. The mutual confidence which previously underlay Turkish-American relations has been shaken. There would be a danger that if the US pressed hard for enosis, the Turks would feel betrayed and decide to intervene militarily. If the reached such a decision, there is a good change they would not consult or even inform us. If they did not intervene, they would make a major effort -perhaps by putting pressure on the US presence in Turkey- to convince the US that they should have a presence on Cyprus of a scope and nature sufficient to satisfy their political needs.

22. Athens is coming to recognize that no Turkish Government could accept enosis without a quid pro quo of some significance. Athens would almost certainly be willing to provide some compensation for resettlement of Turkish Cypriots; it would almost certainly not be ready to cede any territory already Greek. Greece probably would agree to the presence of Turkish forces on a NATO base on the island. Whether Athens would concede the degree of “Turkishness” that would be required to make the proposition acceptable to Ankara would depend upon a complex of factors, among which would be Papandreou’s attitude, Athens’ reading of Ankara’s intervention intentions, and Western pressure on Greece.

23. Acceptance of an enclave under Turkish administration would be difficult for Greek Prime Minister Papandreou. While his parliamentary majority depends on his ability to maintain discipline among the various elements of the governing Center Union, we believe he could win approval of such a concession. If he could be convinced that it was essential. We believe that he is limited in his freedom of maneuver more by his personal convictions and disinclination to exercise leadership than by forces outside his control. If union of the whole island with Greece were involved, Papandreou could probably count on strong support from Greek Cypriot public opinion to overcome whatever resistance Makarios might offer, but such support might not be forthcoming for a settlement involving a Turkish presence on the island.

Likely Developments

24. Settlement is most unlikely without considerable US pressure, which would result, at least for some time, in damage to US relations with Greece, or Turkey, or both. Athens has, at least until recently, seen the tide as flowing in the direction of enosis and is not yet prepared to make any concessions in the direction of double enosis, which the Turks would probably regard as their minimum requirement. It is likely that a combination of elements from both approaches holds out the best chance of an agreed solution –particularly if the use of provocative labels can be avoided.

25. It may be that the parties involved will prove so intractable as to prevent any agreement. In this case, the plight of the Turkish Cypriots would gradually worsen, though a continued UN presence might afford them some protection. But the possibility of acute crisis without warning would persist. In the event of a massacre of Turkish Cypriots, a direct attack on the Turkish contingent, or an immediate threat of sizable Soviet involvement on the island, the Turks would almost certainly feel the need to take military action. Moreover, as time passes without any improvement in the prospects of success, desperation may overtake elements in the Turkish community and cause them to precipitate a major crisis. Pressure to intervene is also building up in the Turkish armed forces and in various levels of the government. Thus Turkish intervention will remain a constant danger.

26. If the Turks intervened, they would justify their action as designed merely for the protection of the Turkish community. But Athens would probably feel compelled to respond by sending additional forces to Cyprus. Though both sides would be reluctant to expand hostilities, the tension and confusion would be likely to result in armed clashes. If, at this point, Greece and Turkey found themselves on the brink of war, their leaders might finally be willing to make the compromises required for a settlement. However, a settlement reached under these conditions would not necessarily be a final solution; it could just as well be another patchwork arrangement.

MILITARY ANNEX

1. Organized military forces on the island currently number approximately 6,000 UN troops, 12,000 UK forces not assigned to the UN, 950 Greek army personnel, and 650 Turkish army personnel. President Makarios is organizing a 25,000-30,000 man Special Security Force or National Guard. Probably at least some of these guardsmen will be conscripted from the estimated 35,000 Greek Cypriots irregulars reported to be on the island. The National Guard is designed to absorb some of the so-called private armies, some with as many as 600 men, which are part of the current Greek Cypriot irregular forces. The Turkish Cypriots have a smaller irregular force, estimated at 10,000.
2. For the most part these personnel are well supplied with small arms. Both sides have mortars, rocket launchers, hand grenades and the like. The Greek Cypriots have affixed armor plate protection to several tractor vehicles and may also have acquired three British 12 ton tanks. Additionally, the Greek Cypriots are seeking to acquire artillery, at least four light aircraft and two helicopters, 12 jet fighters, and nine fast patrol boats. Makarios has stated that he intends to acquire heavy weapons such as aircraft and antiaircraft artillery, presumably from the USSR. Greece has provided officers to assist in organizing and training the Greek Cypriot forces, as well as weapons for those forces. Turkey is training personnel and smuggling them and weapons to the Turkish Cypriots on the island. Thus, each side is in the process of supplying, organizing, and training its forces. The adversaries are temporarily separated from each other by the UN forces.
3. The current status differs materially from the situation on 21 December 1963 when the disorders erupted. At that time it was reported that the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots each had about 3,000 armed irregulars, although each side probably had many more weapons hidden away. While the size and composition of the Greek and Turkish Army contingents on Cyprus are regulated by treaty and thus were the same in December as they are today, there had not yet occured those murders and other incidents which have hardened the feelings of the contingents against each other. It was in the face of the foregoing, that in early January the British moved 2,500 troops to enforce the truce which had been agreed to by both Turkish and Greek Cypriots. During the three months that the British singlehandedly enforced the peace, there was a steady buildup in the numbers and types of weapons brought in either “legally” to the Greek Cypriot-controlled forces or surreptitiously to the Turkish Cypriot irregulars. Lacking terms of reference to curtail arms shipments, the UN forces have noted an intensification of the arms buildup since the arrival of the UN on the island about three months ago.
4. This relative quiet is in marked contrast to the period almost ten yeasts ago when EOKA Greek Cypriot terrorism to attain ENOSIS (union with Greece) resulted in a British pacification campaign requiring 20,000 to 25,000 troops. The EOKA, while relatively few in number, enlisted the support of a sympathetic or terrorized Greek Cypriot population and made good use of the island’s terrain, which is suited for guerilla activity, inflicting about 250 casualties on the British forces during a four year period. Although the British exiled Makarios and engaged in a relentless and ruthless campaign, the disorders ended, as they had started, because of political factors.
5. Both Greece and Turkey have the capability to alter the present balance of military power on the island. Turkey’s military establishment is considerably superior to that of Greece. The Turkish armed forces outnumber those of Greece and are better equipped. Moreover, in any military action concentrated on the Cyprus area, Ankara’s advantage would be enhanced by its proximity to the island. Both forces are deficient in logistic support, communications equipment, and combat vehicles. In particular, deficiencies in ammunition and petroleum would limit operations in any protracted conflict.
6. Turkey’s advantage is most pronounced in its ground forces. The Turkish army of 350,000 outnumbers the Greek by more than three to one, and 15 days after mobilization of reserves its effective combat strength by NATO standards would be 500,000, nearly double that of Greece. Both armies are concentrated along the borders of their Communist neighbors to the north. Turkey’s 39th Division, however, which numbers nearly 12,000 men and has an excellent combat capability, is based in the Iskenderun area. While it is oriented primarily toward the Syrian border, it is the parent unit of the 650-man contingent on Cyprus. It has conducted extensive training maneuvers recently and is generally kept ready to intervene in Cyprus on short notice. Greece has also increased its level of readiness, moving several hundred men to Crete and maintaining other forces alert.
7. Neither country has any highly developed capability in amphibious warfare or in airborne operations, though both are increasing their capability through maneuvers. Greece, despite its generally superior navy and greater seaborne support capability for extended operations, would be extremely vulnerable in mounting any action on Cyprus, by reason of long, exposed supply lines. Both countries have ample civilian carriers for any major troop movement, but Turkey’s proximity to Cyprus would give it a substantial advantage in any deployment there. Moreover, the Turks have a five to one advantage in submarines.
8. The Turkish Air Force is superior to that of Greece. The Turks have a fairly proficient fighter-bomber force, including F-100 and F-104 jet aircraft. The Greeks have only recently received their first few Century series aircraft (F-104s). Most of the Turkish Air Force is located within striking distance of Cyprus, with tactical bombs and napalm containers are stocked at a base less than 200 miles from the island. The air force is capable of close support and reconnaissance missions in the Cyprus area. The Turks could airlift one battalion to Cyprus if they were able to seize control of an airfield on the island. The Greek Air Force, based primarily on the Greek mainland some 500 miles from Cyprus, would experience great difficulty in operating in the area. Some operations could be mounted from Rhodes, within 300 miles of Cyprus, but additional logistic equipment would have to be moved there. The Greeks have the technical capability to airlift a battalion or two to Cyprus, but Turkish air superiority could turn any such operation into a disaster.

December 8, 1967

Cyprus:  The Turkish Government is keeping close watch on developments as the Greek withdrawal begins. The Turks are still annoyed by the diplomatic maneuvers of President Makarios which they believe is designed to vitiate the thrust of the recent agreement. Ankara strongly desires that some way be devised for the UN force on Cyprus to monitor the withdrawal of Greek mainland troops.
The bulk of the Turkish special Cyprus invasion force remains concentrated along Turkey’s southern coast as a reminder of Ankara’s continuing determination to uphold its position on Cyprus.

March 3, 1972

CYPRUS: Archbishop Makarios probably will reject the demand of the Cypriot Bishop that he resign as president. The Bishop’s action is causing renewed fears of civil disturbance. In response to the three Bishop’s demand, which reportedly was made under the influence of Athens, Makarios asked for time to consider their request and has called an emergency meeting of his cabinet. A special meeting of the House of Representatives is also scheduled for today. If the three Bishops remain united, under Canon law they could theoretically strip Makarios of his ecclesiastical functions should he refuse to resign as president. However, in past confrontations with the Bishops, Makarios has had no trouble in dividing and outmaneuvering them. Makarios will probably first attempt a public campaign against the Bishops, and mass demonstrations are planned in support of the Archbishop in Nicosia today. If the campaign fails and civil disturbances threaten Cypriot stability, Makarios might resign and call for a plebiscite. At present, all indications are that the majority of Greek Cypriots would support the Archbishop.

January 28, 1974

CYPRUS: The leadership of George Grivas’ National Organization for the Cyprus Struggle will pass to former Cyprus Army Major Stavros Stavrou, his second-in-command. The announcement was made by officials of the Grivas organization following Grivas’ death from a heart attack in southern Cyprus yesterday. Stavrou was arrested several months ago in a government crackdown that has left the organization in poor shape to survive Griva’s death.

April 9, 1974

CYPRUS: The UN’s special representative on Cyprus is trying to work out a formula that will allow resumption of the intercommunal talks, which adjourned last week without setting a new date for negotiations. Prospects for the six-year-old talks’ resuming after a period of hard bargaining appear relatively good. The current impasse was precipitated by the Greek Cypriots, who chose to make an issue of Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit’s public statement on March 29 that advocated a federal system of government for Cyprus. Federalism is anathema to President Makarios and the Greek Cypriots, who insist that talks are pointless unless the object is the creation of a unitary, independent Cypriot state. Turkish Cypriot Vice President Denktash and the Turkish ambassador in Cyprus have tried to play down Ecevit’s statement, claiming misinterpretation and denying that there has been any change in Turkish policy toward Cyprus.
Although Ecevit and his party are on record as favoring federalism for Cyprus, this presumably represents Ankara’s maximum bargaining position. Similarly, the Greek Cypriot’s decision to stall the talks at this time on the basis of statements made only in Turkey is essentially a tactical gambit. President Makarios has declared that if the deadlock is not broken, the Cyprus issue should be returned to the UN. Athens last week repeated its standard line in support of the intercommunal talks and an independent, unitary Cypriot state. President Makarios fears, however, that Athens may be playing a double game by clandestinely supporting enosis, which aims at the union of Cyprus and Greece, and by plotting against him.

August 17, 1974 - CYPRUS - GENERAL SITUATION

1. No major fighting occurred on Cyprus today, although cease-fire violations were widespread as Turkish units attempted to secure areas beyond what they held yesterday. In Greece, there were continuing signs of growing anti-US sentiment but no serious incidents. Meanwhile, the Turks seem quite satisfied with their present position although there are no prospects for an early resumption of the peace talks.

 THE MILITARY SITUATION

2. Localized fighting continued on Cyprus today despite the cease-fire. Fighting around the international airport appears to have ended by mid-afternoon, but 12 miles southeast of Nicosia Turkish forces captured the village of Pyroi after a fierce battle. A UN observer believes that the Turks will now move toward Louroujina, some seven miles south of Pyroi, to link up with Turkish Cypriots who have been holding out against Greek National Guard attacks.

3. The Turkish advance constitutes the most serious violation of the cease-fire south of the “Attila Line” which supposedly delimits the southern boundary of Turkish territorial claims on the island.

4. Elsewhere, sporadic fighting was reported at Limnitis and Kokkina in the west of the island.
GREECE – US

5. Ambassador Tasca has been given assurances by the ministry of foreign affairs as well as by Minister of Defense Averoff that the appropriate security officials have been instructed to provide protection to US personnel and installations and to take extra precautions in the present tense circumstances. The ambassador received similar assurances from the Athens police chief and the commanding general of the gendarmerie.

6. ... a large anti-American demonstration was held in the city this afternoon but that the demonstrators did not march on the base as had been feared. Greek police and army leaders on the island have promised full support in protecting the base. In addition, a US carrier group is now about 30 miles from Iraklion and is standing by to evacuate personnel should that become necessary.

7. Elsewhere in Greece, relations between Greek and US military personnel have moved from friendly to formal. Moreover, there are some cases in which US airmen and ships were prevented from reaching supplies and equipment, or were required to make long detours to do so. There have been some reports that US vehicles and servicemen in uniforms have been stoned and verbally abused outside US bases.

DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY

8. Yugoslav Vice-President and Foreign Minister Milos Minic met today with Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis and Foreign Minister Mavros. Quoting diplomatic sources in Athens, UPI reports that Minic brought a message from Tito urging the Greeks and Turks to begin talking again. UPI also reports that Minic is scheduled to travel on to Ankara tomorrow to deliver Tito’s message to Turkish leaders, indicating that the Yugoslavs may be seeking a mediating role.

9. An early resumption of the peace talks seems unlikely, however, as the Greeks continue to refuse to negotiate in the face of a “fait accompli.” ... the current Greek position is that the Turkish troops must pull back to position held on August 9 -prior to the second round of fighting- before talks can resume.

CYPRIOT VIEWS

10. Political consultations in Nicosia intensified today. Luis Weckmann, special representative of the UN Secretary General, and Vrem Chand, commander of the UN forces on the island, met with Cypriot President Clerides in what was described as a lengthy discussion of the overall situation. No official statement was issued after the meeting but press reports that Weckmann raised the possibility of resuming the Geneva peace talks. Weckmann and Chand will meet this evening with Turkish Cypriot leader Ecevit Unell, who is acting vice-president in the absence of Raul Denktash.

11. Press accounts state that Clerides hopes to postpone the opening of formal peace talks to give himself more time to mobilize international public opinion in support of the Greek Cypriot cause -hope- fully to bring pressure on the Turks to withdraw their forces. Clerides does not want to get out in front of the Greek government by accepting any proposal to resume the Geneva talks at this time.

12. In Ankara, Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash criticized the decision by the Greek government not to start negotiations. He stated that the Turkish Cypriots are quite prepared to administer the area under their military control until a final settlement is reached. Should Athens change its mind, Denktash indicated that the Turkish side is prepared to discuss the relationship between the two autonomous sectors and the powers that would be vested in a federal government. He ruled out any discussion at the peace talks concerning the internal affairs of the Turkish sector. He noted that an exchange of populations between the two sectors would probably be necessary but stated that it should be on a voluntary basis.

TURKS RELAXING

13. In Ankara today Turkish leaders congratulated the armed forces on their victories in Cyprus. Prime Minister Ecevit, playing the Cyprus operation for all the political mileage he can get, led an official delegation to general staff headquarters to congratulate personally General Sancar, armed forces chief of staff, on the performance of his forces. As tensions eased, the restrictions on public movement through the military areas along the coast were lifted.

Source - http://latistor.blogspot.gr/2014/01/cia.html