Greek Bank employees’ "Rebellion” Against Soc. Security Reform: A Reborn Social Movement?”

 Logo of Social Insurance Institute of Greece (IKA). (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

ATHANASIOS TSAKIRIS
PhD, Political Science and Public Administration
National and Kapodistrean University of Athens
greekunions

“Greek bank employees’ “rebellion” against social security reform in Greece: A reborn social movement?”
Alternative Futures and Popular Protest, Manchester Metropolitan University (30/3/05-1/4/05).

Introduction
“The measures proposed by the government for encountering the social insurance problem will dramatically shrink and curtail the insurance rights of the working people as well as the contents of Social Insurance. The nature of these measures consists in collecting and taxing; they are one-sided and they affect only the working people and the pensioners. No further support by the state’s budget or the employers is anticipated. These measures are doomed to face the workers’ total opposition by and to fail passing through the parliament”. (Statement by Mr. D. Kouselas, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Hellenic Bank Employees’ Federation-OTOE, 19.4.2001)

The beginning of the 21st century found Greece in the midst of an open economic and social crisis on the verge of saltation into a political crisis. The socialist government of Kostas Simitis having exhausted all possible political weapons capable of persuading the majority of the population to continue providing its voting support to PASOK (Pan Hellenic Socialist Movement) could not constrain the oppositional tendencies that were gaining ground even between its own rank-and-file members. The above-mentioned statement made by Mr. Kouselas is indicative of the strong antithesis between the government and its most friendly supporters among PASOK’s member that composed the modernising fraction of the party. The socialist government’s fate to lose the general elections of March 2004 was predetermined when its attempt to reform the social security system during the first half of 2001 provoked an unparalleled worker rebellion. This rebellion caused the dismissal of the Minister of Labour and Social Security, Mr. A. Giannitsis, in the government reshuffle that followed.

The social insurance issue is a long-standing problem affecting all aspects of the Greek society and economy, much more so Greek politics. Historically, Greek governments did not develop a reliable social security system that could have been integrated in a wider social welfare state. The need of the ruling classes to integrate as many patron social groups as they could into the political – electoral system so that the working class and its allies could not mobilise against the established capitalist mode of production has lead to the formation of a distinct type of welfare state. This type of welfare state is characterised by inequalities in all its main fields of activity, e.g. maintenance of costly insurance funds that do not pay living pensions to the retirees or do not provide adequate health services to the people. Some social groups pay more contributions to the social security system than others and enjoy higher pensions or health services than others. Moreover, there are differences in the interior of many industries. The banking industry is the best example in this case. Employees of the central Bank of Greece pay fewer contributions and enjoy higher pensions or health services compared to employees of private banks. The absence of a coherent strategy on the part of the state, the political parties, and the trade unions makes thing worst. In such a historical political setting we must add the economic and social factors that have contributed to this outcome. Factors such as the requirements of private and state capitalist enterprises to keep down labour costs (wages, salaries and contributions to the social security system) had driven thousands of workers off the social security system (immigrants to foreign countries) or to self-employment and small enterprises using flexible forms of employment (temporary and leased workers, part-timers, outsourcing, unpaid family members) as well as non-insured immigrants from other countries (e.g. Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe). On the other hand, the male breadwinner family-centred social structure plays a significant role in determining this outcome by depriving the system of crucial financial resources due to the late entrance of women and young people in the labour market. Combined the high levels of unemployment this social and economic situation creates a “dependency discourse” as more and more citizens are pushed to the social periphery being supported economically by the labour of less working citizens.

During the 1990s the social insurance system’s crisis was worsened. According to studies published by the Labour Institutes of OTOE and GSEE (General Confederation of Greek Workers) the main reasons aggravating the crisis were the following:

1. Demographic problems. - Greek society is growing old very fast. The following table shows that until 2050 the dependency ratio of people over 65 years old will be more than doubled as percentage of the population between 15 and 64 years old. This means that in the same way worker contributions will decline causing the financing asphyxiation of social insurance funds unless the governments and the dominant social classes pay their dues and legalise all immigrants.

TABLE 1
Year Total Population of Greece Population over 65 years old Ratio of old-aged people over 65 as percentage (%) of the population between 15 and 64 years old
2000 10,307,535 1,881,429 27.180
2002 10,350,872 1,924,510 27.792
2004 10,394,391 1,967,590 28.404
2006 10,438,094 2,010,666 29.016
2008 10,481,980 2,053,738 29.628
2010 10,526,050 2,096,803 30.240
2012 10,562,923 2,147,641 31.032
2014 10,579,830 2,193,447 31.824
2016 10,584,062 2,235,797 32.616
2018 10,579,829 2,275,582 33.408
2020 10,562,908 2,311,621 34.200
2022 10,531,243 2,361,034 35.352
2024 10,499,673 2,409,114 36.504
2026 10,468,197 2,455,897 37.656
2028 10,436,816 2,501,417 38.808
2030 10,405,529 2,545,708 39.960
2032 10,388,882 2,624,261 41.814
2034 10,379,534 2,702,592 43.668
2036 10,376,420 2,780,653 45.522
2038 10,376,524 2,857,722 47.376
2040 10,377, 043 2,933,029 49.230
2042 10,377,977 2,982,718 50.472
2044 10,379,326 3,031,759 51.714
2046 10,381,090 3,080,180 52.956
2048 10,383,271 3,128,004 54.198
2050 10,385,867 3,175,257 55.440
Source: Robolis S., Romanias G., and Maryios V. (2001) Actuary Study of the Social Insurance System in Greece, Athens: INE GSEE-ADEDY


2. Unemployment. High unemployment rates –both in Greece and the rest of Europe have been contributing to the undermining of the social insurance system.


TABLE 2
EMPLOYMENT
(in thousands) LABOUR FORCE
(in thousands) UNEMPLOYMENT RATE (%) PARTICIPATION RATE (%)
1975 3230 3280 1.5
1976 3235 3296 1.9
1977 3262 3318 1.7
1978 3276 3337 1.8
1979 3311 3375 1.9
1980 3356 3451 2.8
1981 3529 3674 3.9 61.1
1982 3501 3718 5.8 60.8
1983 3540 3846 8.0 63.4
1984 3552 3868 8.2 63.3
1985 3589 3893 7.8 62.2
1986 3601 3887 7.4 61.8
1987 3597 3884 7.4 61.2
1988 3657 3961 7.7 61.8
1989 3671 3967 7.5 61.5
1990 3719 4000 7.0 60.9
1991 3632 3933 7.7 59.3
1992 3685 4035 8.7 60.8
1993 3720 4118 9.7 61.2
1994 3790 4193 9.6 61.9
1995 3824 4249 10.0 62.7
1996 3872 4318 10.3 63.5
1997 3854 4294 10.2 63.2
1998 3967 4446 10.8 64.1
1999 3940 4463 11.7 64.5
2000 3946 4437 11.1 64.5
2001 3917 4362 10.2 63.5
Source: Labour Force Study: National Statistics Agency of Greece (ESYE)
These two problems are exogenous reasons that affect the funds’ “maturing” as shown in the table below. 


TABLE 3
THE MATURING OF THE FUNDS
 Total of agencies under the competence of the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance ΙΚΑ Farmers Insurance Organisation (OGA) Professionals and Craftsmen Fund (TEBE) Public
 1975 3.53 3.92 3.34 2.57 0.62
1980 3.16 4.04 2.44 2.99 0.89
1985 2.89 3.43 2.29 3.12 1.10
1990 2.50 2.82 1.72 3.99 0.82
1994 2.31 2.49 1.58 4.01 0.92
Source: Social Budget 1975-1995

As for the bank employees’ funds this ratio was close to that of public employees. Especially for the National Bank’s Employees Special Fund the ratio amounted to 1.75 while for the other special funds (Agricultural Bank, Ionia Bank, Bank of Greece and National Bank for Economic Development) to 1.

3. Blocking of funds. Emergency Law No.1611/1950 provides that “the insurance funds’ surpluses are deposited in the Bank of Greece, which is obliged to channel these surpluses through the commercial banks into the progress and development of Greek industry and commerce.” The lending interest rate was extremely low compared to the interest rate for the financing of the funds (e.g. the funds deposited their reserves to the Bank of Greece at an interest rate 5.5% between 1951 και 1983, 8% after 1983, 13.5% in the mid ’90s, but meanwhile the inflation was running at double or/and triple rates and the funds were financed at an interest rate amounting to 18.5% in 1986). It was estimated that IKA had been deprived of financial resources amounting to 450 billion drachmas (in current prices). This law is still in force. Moreover, the funds have been given the right (L. 2042/1992) to invest 20% of their existing reserves in stocks (60%) and in real estate (40%). Law No.1902/1990 provides the opportunity to the funds to create their own funds or to participate in the existing ones as well as to contract with Mutual Funds Management Limited Companies. As a result, the employees’ contributions were to be accumulated, capitalized, and invested in the money market. Besides that, we must mention that the funds’ real estate assets were granted or leased to third parties at unacceptably low rates.

4. Since 1956 all governments avoided the statutory trilateral (state-employers-employees) funding of the social insurance system.

5. The exercise of social, national and developmental policies through the insurance funds. The Greek State granted non-compensating pensions to Greek origin refugees from Egypt, Turkey and Romania without paying the necessary amounts provided for by the state budgets.

6. Contribution payment evasion and exemptions. Industrialists and other employers have been evading paying contributions to the system. Their debts to IKA amounted to more than 1.76 billion euros annually. Even state-controlled agencies and organizations owe more than 3.8 billion euros to IKA; moreover, the state settled to pay its debts in 15 annual installments at the rate of 2%.

7. The organizational fragmentation of the social security system.

8. The bureaucratic operation of the funds due to the anachronistic legal framework and the management of the funds by administrations appointed by the governments. Successive governments tried to impose policies that were supposed to solve the viability problem of the insurance system. Under the pretext of “iniquitous deficits” of the social security funds these governments promoted the capitalisation of the funds’ reserves and the reductions of benefits aiming at the establishment of a minimum mandatory public pension forcing the employees to invest their insurance contributions in private insurance firms. The funds were impelled to operate as private financial investors placing their reserves either in mutual funds or in high-risk securities as we mentioned above. Through a series of laws the governments of ND (1990-1993) had already cut out many of the social rights of workers and pensioners (e.g. retirement of mothers with minors after 15 years of insured work, retirement limits for those that had entered the labour market and the insurance system after 1993). After the electoral overthrow of ND from the government, PASOK did not cancel the laws passed by ND, thus showing that its policies would follow suit. In 1998 the modernisers that had taken over PASOK and the Simitis government passed a new law that aimed at curtailing a series of pensions (widowhood, subsidiary pensions, etc.), at limiting health expenses, at the gradual liberalization of the funds’ asset management etc. What seemed to differentiate PASOK’s governmental policies than those of the ND governments was that PASOK initiated a new process for policy making and its legitimisation. This new process was called “social dialogue”. Although “social dialogue” is a long-standing policy making process in EU countries it was formally initiated as official EU policy procedure with the Maastricht Treaty. In the Greek case where pressures to incorporate the trade union movement in the economic and political system were always hard during the socialist governments’ domination the social dialogue took the form of tripartite discussions between state, employers and employees and especially with the creation by law in 1994 and development of the Social and Economic Committee (OKE). The parties of the left, mainly KKE and the left wing of Synaspismos, did not consent to the tripartite cooperation and took to the streets many times in the late 1990s for various issues such as labour relations, overtime pay restrictions, social security etc. Even ND did not consent to many of the policies decided by the social dialogue bodies due to the pressures of their voters. Most of the meetings were between PASOK’s ministers and PASOK’s trade unionists along with the employers’ representatives (mainly the industrialists of the Hellenic Industries Association-SEB).

These socio-economical conditions formed the structural constraints upon the working class people who had to work hard in order to achieve a minimum living income both during their working lives and retirement.

There were a lot of factors contributing to the “rebellion” of Greek workers and bank employees in the conjuncture during which it went off. Let us see the main ones. First of all, it was a time when the political skills of the Prime Minister Mr. K. Simitis and his modernising social-democratic government had been worn off and could not be used any more for the manipulation of the public opinion. Neither was the governing party able to mobilise its rank-and-file in order to support the government. The goal of the previous governmental tenure, that is the incorporation of Greece to the European Monetary Union (EMU), had been achieved. The once “catch-all” political party named Pan Hellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) had become a “cartel party” which depended on the state and the mass media for its survival. Its new governmental tenure could not be justified electorally to millions of members and voters that had voted for the party in order to secure or/and advance their social rights in front of the threat of right-wing neoliberalism that was purported to be represented by ND.

On the other hand, both the major and the minor opposition parties were in a state of a long wait recognising the government’s initiative (mainly the major opposition party of “New Democracy”). The minor parties of the left opposition (Communist Party of Greece/Kommounistiko komma Hellados, and Coalition of Left and Progress/Synaspismos tis Aristeras kai tis Proodou) were fighting against each other for the political-ideological hegemony upon a shrinking political audience, and then we must bear in mind that these two parties are promoting totally different ideological-political agendas which cannot be matched together in a coherent political plan.

In such a setting the trade union movement had to take into account more factors in order to restructure its agenda and its organization. Moreover, it was a time when the political consensus on the issues of economy such as destatisation/privatisation of previously public utilities etc was mounting. The programmatic differences between the two mainstream parties PASOK and ND were not essential and they did not have to do with structural socio-economic and political but with secondary or cultural issues, such as EU funds appropriation or the separation of the state from the church. Both parties were now operating under the agenda of neoliberal or social-liberal capitalist restructuring.

The governmental proposals

According to the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, its proposals would not bring about any changes to the general retirement ages, social security contributions, state funding, public nature and rationale of the social security system, or conditions for retirement with regard to entitlement to minimum pensions. Effectively, the following four changes had been proposed:

• The statutory age for entitlement to a pension was at that time 65 years for all those have been employed and covered by social security for the first time since 1/1/1993. For those employed and covered by social security before this date, the official retirement age was 65 for men and 60 for women, though their real age of retirement was 61.5 years for men and 58.5 years for women. The government proposed that the existing retirement ages should, after a transitional period of over five years, also come into effect for those insured people to whom they did not at that tme apply, with any necessary exceptions.

• At that time, the “replacement ratio” of pensions for those employed for the first time before 1993 was 80% of their previous purchasing power. However, it was only 60% for those employed for the first time since 1993. The government proposed that the 60% replacement ratio be applied to all pensioners.
• The minimum pension was then GRD 124,300 (364.8 euros) per month for those who have performed 15 years of paid work covered by social security, and were aged 65 or above. The government proposed a gradual reduction of the minimum pension to GRD 67,875 (199.2 euros) per month starting from 2007, to be partially offset in some cases by an additional benefit like the Benefit of Social Solidarity for Pensioners (EKAS) – for example, where the pensioner has no other means and otherwise would face extreme poverty.

• Changes to the structure of the social insurance system.
• The proposed regulations are to be applied to:
• all social insurance bodies;
• all insured people, without discrimination between those insured before 31 December 1992 and after 1 January 1993; and
• men and women, without discrimination on grounds of gender.

Against these governmental proposals the working class and the overwhelming majority of public and private employees revolted with so much passion for the first time since the fall of the dictatorship.

The Hellenic Bank Employees’ Federation’ objective at that time (Resolution of the 26th Congress that was held on October 2000) was to create a United Bank Employees Insurance Fund (E.T.A.T.) with the following characteristics:

• 1. Independent-autonomous fund, which shall operate either as an association or a public entity.
• 2. Representatives from the banks, the employees and the pensioners would consist the management of the Fund. The Fund’s Articles of Association could be amended only with the consensus of both sides (employees – banks).
• 3. The banks would undertake the responsibility to guarantee this Fund.
• 4. Contributions and donations would be bilateral (employees – employers) and at a ratio 1/2.
• 5. The age limits and the pensions level should be those decided by the employees at the referendum held in 1992.
• 6. The existing funds’ assets would come under the authority of the United Bank Employees Insurance Fund (E.T.A.T.)
• 7. It would be based on three principles: similar contributions, similar benefits, and similar preconditions.
• 8. The Fund would involve all bank employees without any discriminations or distinctions.

The Fund would operate taking as a model the Funds of the Commercial Bank of Greece and Alpha Bank, which means that:

• 1. it would pay the whole pension (main and subsidiary) to its pensioners-members, immediately after their retirement on the terms and conditions provided in its Articles of Associations. For example, if an employee retires at the age of 56 he would receive immediately his/her pension (main and subsidiary) from the Fund.
• 2. When this employee reaches the retirement age limit required by the Social Security Foundation (IKA-controlled by the State), e.g. at the age of 60, IKA would pay to him/her or to the Fund the main pension that he/she is entitled to by IKA.
• 3. Thus, the employee will still receive the same pension but the ETAT will be disburdened by the part of the main pension that IKA will pay.

EXPLANATIONS

What made more than 150,000 working people rally round the trade unions and participate in demonstrations, protests, and even riots. It was quite a surprise to see so many people taking to the streets although only a few months ago the majority of them had voted once more for the governing party approving its previous policies regarding the social insurance issues? Or, when these same people did not participate in the day-to-day procedures of trade unions as compared to the past decades? Was this “rebellion” a result of a regular return of the working people to “collective action”? There could be a lot of answers to these questions.

One of the popular themes of mainstream political sociology stresses the individualization of social and political life and the end of the social classes. The result is the decrease of union density and membership. G. Paschos assumed that it is not correct to stress that there is a regular comeback of collectivity and politicisation: “[T]he government’s proposals for the funds’ deficits and the reform of the miserly insurance system came up against marginal insecurities of a great number of insured and retired citizens. These proposals exceeded some limits (…) and functioned as a fuse mobilising thousands of fellow citizens.” This means that the government’s attack “against our social security rights was not conceived as a social annoyance” but, on the contrary, the attack was “individualised diversely” and conceived as “a personal abuse of the core of the private”. It follows that the individualisation of the threat destabilised personally every individual and that the individual’s risk was an exogenous imposition. One of the new qualitative features of the mass reaction of the workers which exceeded the constraints set by the circumstances was that the “individualised conception of the threat divides and, at the same time, binds the people”. The collectivity that resulted was not a “collectivity of solidarity” because what was mobilised was nothing more than an “privatised collectivity” that does not go into sensitivities and common fronts for the securing of social rights” and does not seem “to engraft collective action with endurance, duration and density”. Suchlike solidarity that was demonstrated through the mobilisations was nothing else than a “stage”. This new type collectivity corresponds to “the laws of the market and to a renewed individualism”. In such a context, “the privatised insecurities do not easily come upon” and when they “come upon publicly, even in the form of an aggregation of individuals of the same homeopathy” they may sometimes go further and be more successful compared to the hollow partisan disputations, without though being able to provide a fair and rational social security system that may stand out against neo-liberalism. We should be cautious with views that erase social aggregates, such as the working class, from the political and social playing field. Of course, neither do government policies automatically create long-lasting social movements nor a few mass demonstrations and strikes amount to an overcome of the crisis of traditional trade unionism that is a current issue in both the political and the scientific fields.

From the perspective of a rational choice approach presented by K. Featherstone, G. Kazamias and D. Papadimitriou, the pension system had become a huge fiscal burden on the state, threatening Greece’s position in the European Union. Moreover, its gross inequalities of provision and bureaucratic inefficiency were symptoms of the embedded “clientelism” and “disjointed corporatism” that stood in the way of the government’s self-proclaimed ‘modernization’ programme. In the event, though EMU entry requirements empowered the reform momentum, a combination of the strategic weakness of key actors and the entrenched opposition of sectoral interests dissipated the initiative. The failure suggests the relevance of the wider social setting to reform: in particular, the weakness of the technocratic community and the relative absence of a supportive ‘advocacy coalition’, beyond the dominance of the “party state”. Faced with criticism, the political leadership sought to protect their electoral position and postponed pressing decisions . Although this point of view writes off parts of the realities, e.g. the fact that Simitis’s government was this time challenged by the national confederation (GSEE) supported by its famous Labour Institute (INE/GSEE), which had already studied the proposals and had their counter-proposal ready to be published.

It could be said that certain policies might be more vulnerable to popular labor protest than others. D. Gravaris and M. Spourdalakis argue that PASOK’s policies on the social insurance issue were intervening in the output of the insurance system, that is pension levels and retirement limits whilst ND’s policies were intervening in the input side of the system, that is financial contributions to the system. Workers could tolerate a small reduction of their salaries in order to finance the system. Moreover the ND governments, especially in 1992, treated the so-called “influential unions” with more cautiousness compared to the social security funds of the private sector of the economy. The government of ND passed Law 2084/92 which exempted strong union funds from the overall It was not so easy for them to accept reductions of the already low pensions or to stay in a non-compensating labor market for a longer time span. PASOK’s successful record in taming the labor movement could not be sustained any more. That was the paradox. ND had dealt with the pension issue with more cautiousness than PASOK, despite the latter’s more “populist” or “corporatist” policies.

Common opinion surveys show that this view can be based upon data from empirical research. Some figures are indicative:

“What do you consider as the greatest problem that you face nowadays?” 17,5% of the respondents regarded that the most serious problem was the threesome one “insurance-pensions-care” followed by the threesome problem “excessive work hours/violation of legal work hours/arbitrary changes” that was conceived as most significant by 14% of the responders. “Individualism/competition/bad relations between employees” ranked eighth with only 2.3% of the responders selecting it a most significant problem”. In addition, it is the respondents who belong to the “45-54” age category that regard the insurance problem as the most serious one followed by those that belong to the 35-44 age category. This means that the employees belonging to most productive ages are those who are anxious about the pension system and its future and who are the majority of the working people.

Moreover, 50,1% of the respondents considered the pensions that the pensions being paid today by their insurance funds are rather satisfactory as against 19,5% of the respondents who believe that pensions are somewhat satisfactory. 40.8% of the respondents answered that they were somewhat informed on the pensions issue as against 29,4% of the respondents who answered that they were informed enough while 17,9% of the respondents were not informed at all and 9,7% very well informed. It is equally interesting that 49,4% of the respondents are rather anxious about the prospect of financing their pensions, 26.2% were very anxious as against 17.3% who answered that they were rather confident, 2.8% who were very confident. Another interesting question that supports the above opinion is on “after how many insurance years do you think it is right to retire and receive a pension?” 42.6% of the respondents think that they must retire after of 30 insurance years, as against 28,5% that thing that it is right to retire after 35 insurance years. Moreover, 19.3% of the respondents thought that 25 insurance years are sufficient and 8.5% answered that 20 insurance years are enough. To the question “at what age do you think it is right to retire and receive a pension?” 33.9% responded that they must retire at the age of 55, 23.9% at the age of 60, 20.3% at the age of 50, 7.6% at 45, 6.6% without age limit, 4.2% at 65, and 4.2% without reference to age. Another interesting figure of the survey is that on an aggregate level bank employees are not satisfied by their working conditions, their salaries and their work futures: 42.1% dissatisfied, 35% fully satisfied, and 19,5% rather satisfied. Taking into account that these employees will retire during the next two decades and that the privatization and destatisation policies will speed up in European countries and in Greece one could appreciate the reactions of the majority of the employees of state-controlled banks (National Bank, Agricultural Bank, Commercial Bank) as well as other small private banks who answer that are dissatisfied with their salaries and their future work prospects. On the contrary, low dissatisfaction levels are expressed by employees of large private banks perhaps due to the fact that their employees are aware of the circumstances and they do not feel as vulnerable as their colleagues in state-controlled banks are. Last but not least, bank employees believe that there must be a uniform solution to the social insurance problem that will be appropriate to all bank employees 82.4% as against 14.7% who believe that there must be different solutions according to the specific conditions of each separate bank). The only reaction to a uniform solution derives from the employees of the Bank of Greece whose insurance regime is a product of early struggles and is known to be the model for all other banks.

As we can make out from the above survey data, this “rebellion” was a condensed expression of severe discontent among a dynamic part of the employees that could not be controlled easily through traditional collective action in a routine negotiation process similar to that of a collective agreement covering issues such as wages and salaries or working terms and conditions. The mobilization of the employees’ dissatisfaction against governmental policies on the insurance issue was a good chance for all the working people who did not usually participate in internal procedures of trade unions to voice their thoughts and feelings superseding the bureaucratic structures of their representative associations.